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 I. Introduction 
 The provision of finance for the purchase of residential housing is, or should be, an 
important part of any society's financial structure.  Because a housing unit is inevitably a relatively 
large purchase, compared with most households' incomes, finance is unavoidable -- especially if 
self-finance is included as a possibility. 
 Efficient finance for residential housing can encourage a better matching of households' 
preferences for housing with the available and potential supply of housing, improving social 
welfare.  Further, to the extent that efficient finance encourages more widespread ownership by 
occupiers, there are likely to be additional social benefits.1 
 This essay will be about one specific form of finance for the purchase of residential 
housing: mortgage-backed securities (MBS).  This form is relatively new.  It has been in existence 
in the U.S. for less than three-and-a-half decades.2  Nevertheless, it has become an important part of 
the housing finance system of the U.S. -- as of 2003, MBS accounted for more than half of all 
single-family residential mortgages in the U.S. -- and has spread to a few other countries.  It is 
certainly worthy of consideration as part of any housing finance system.3 
 The remainder of this essay will proceed as follows:  In Section II we will review the 
general problem of finance and why it deserves special attention.  Section III will briefly outline the 
major alternative forms of finance for housing, including MBS.  Section IV will delve more deeply 
into the MBS system, describing its major features, its advantages and disadvantages, and its 
contextual underpinnings.  Section V will provide some data on the development of MBS in the 
                                                           
    1 There is a small but convincing literature as to the social benefits from home ownership.  See, for example, Rohe 
and Stegman (1994), Rohe and Stewart (1996), Rossi and Weber (1996), Green and White (1997), and DiPasquale and 
Glaeser (1999). 
    2 It has, however, existed in Denmark for considerably longer. 
    3 Extensive discussion of MBS can be found in Bruskin and Sykes (1997), Bruskin et al. (2000), Fabozzi et al. (1997, 
2000), Fabozzi and Dunleavy (1997), Hu (1997), Fabozzi (2001), and Hayre (2001a, 2001b). 
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U.S. housing finance context.4  And Section VI will offer some conclusions. 
 
 
 II. The General Problem of Finance 
 Financial transactions, except for self-finance, always involve at least two parties.  Though 
financial transactions can attain great complexity, their essence can be portrayed in terms of a 
simple loan transaction:  Party A lends money or resources to Party B at time t and expects to be 
repaid at some future time t+1. 
 At one level, this simple example may seem to be trivial and uninteresting.  But it conveys 
the essence of finance: the time dimension, and the lender's expectation of repayment.  Because 
repayment occurs at a future date, separated in time from the initial loan, the lender generally must 
be concerned about the assurance of repayment.  Before making the loan, the lender will want to be 
assured that the prospective borrower is likely to repay the loan (and any interim interest that is 
charged); and even during the period of the loan the lender is likely to want to be assured that the 
borrower's actions are consistent with timely repayment.  But the lender faces problems of 
"asymmetric information":  The borrower is likely to know more about its own proclivities with 
respect to repayment than does the lender.  Consequently, finance is associated with extensive 
efforts involving before-the-loan information gathering and assessment of potential borrowers and 
during-the-loan monitoring of actual borrowers, with institutions and practices arising so as to 
facilitate these information-intensive processes. 
 In general terms, the processes of finance can be described in terms of the informational 
transparency or opacity of potential borrowers, as portrayed in Figure 1.  In that figure, potential 
borrowers are arrayed along the horizontal line, according to how informationally transparent (or 
                                                           
    4 For discussion of the role of MBS in the residential finance systems of the United Kingdom and of Australia, see 
Hayre and Thompson (2001) and DiMartino and Young (2001), respectively. 
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opaque) they are with respect to the finance-related information that a potential lender would want 
to know.  At the left side would be, for example, a young adult who is entering the labor force and 
has had no previous financial transactions; he/she has little in the way of a "track record" that can 
assure a lender as to repayment and is thus highly opaque.  At the right side would be, for example, 
the U.S. Government, whose track record for repayment is transparent and well regarded.  In 
between would be individuals, enterprises, organizations, and governments of varying degrees of 
transparency. 
 These potential borrowers can be matched with various categories of lenders.  At the far 
left, highly opaque borrowers are likely to have to rely for their finance on family and friends, who 
may have special information about the individual or special means of extracting repayment or who 
may be willing to provide "concessional finance" by converting a loan into a grant.  At the far right, 
highly transparent (and reliable) borrowers can access the securities/bond markets, where bonds are 
purchased by investors (who thus lend to the borrower) who rely heavily on the publicly available 
information about and reputation of the borrower.5  In between, financial institutions that are 
information gathering and assessment specialists (such as banks and other depositories, finance 
companies, insurance companies, venture capital firms) are likely to be the sources of finance for 
borrowers of intermediate transparency/opaqueness. 
 The legal framework and the institutional and historical context in which the financial 
transactions are embedded are likely to influence the specific mix of which kinds of lenders provide 
what kinds of finance to which borrowers.  This indeterminacy is indicated by the two shaded 
rectangles that separate the three categories of providers of finance. 
 Finally, the arrows that are placed through the separation rectangles point to the left.  This is 
meant to indicate the direction in which technological change in finance -- primarily, improvements 
                                                           
    5 Bond buyers are likely also to be aided by the information generated by financial advisors, securities analysts, and 
bond rating firms. 
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in data processing and telecommunications, but also encompassing intellectual advances such as the 
Black-Scholes-Merton option-pricing model6 and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM)7 -- has 
pushed the boundaries.  The right-hand boundary has moved to the left as technological change has 
permitted the securities markets to "invade" the "territory" of financial transactions that used to be 
the exclusive domain of the information specialist finance providers (such as banks); this is the 
process of "securitization", of which the MBS expansion has been a major part.  The left-hand 
boundary has moved to the left as well, as technological change has permitted banks and other 
lenders to provide finance (e.g., through credit cards) to individuals who previously could rely only 
on family and friends. 
 In sum, finance is intricate, interesting, and important.  We now turn to the specifics of 
housing finance. 
 
 
 III. Housing Finance 
 There are essentially three major elements involved in any loan: 
 (1) Origination: the initial granting and funding of the loan;8 
 (2) Ultimate holding and funding: the eventual holding (and thus funding) of the loan;9 and 
                                                           
    6 See Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). 
    7 See Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1969). 
    8 Preceding the actual origination of the loan will be information gathering by the borrower, so as to find the best 
terms, and information gathering by the originator, so as to assure itself of the creditworthiness of the borrower.  Each 
side may hire specialists to help in this process:  The buyer may employ a "mortgage broker" to help find the best deal; 
the lender may employ a credit bureau to investigate the financial history of the borrower and an appraiser to estimate 
the value of any collateral (such as the house, for a residential mortgage) that is pledged to support the loan in the event 
of direct payment default by the borrower. 
    9 Again, the holder of the loan will want to collect information about the creditworthiness of the borrower, so as to 
assure itself of timely repayment.  Also, the holder may be able to transfer (at a cost) the credit risk of default by the 
borrower to another party. 
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 (3) Servicing: the arrangements to facilitate timely payment of principal and interest. 
In addition, lenders will want some agreed-to arrangements for default contingencies: the 
procedures that will be followed in the event that the borrower fails to make timely payments. 
 Housing finance is no exception to this pattern, and we will describe the institutional 
arrangements that have arisen for housing finance. 
 The three elements of finance can all be performed by the same entity; this is often 
described as "vertical integration".  Or they can be separately performed by different, "vertically 
disintegrated" entities.  Though the former pattern is more traditional and more common, the latter 
has grown in frequency with the advent of MBS as a finance alternative. 
 There are at least eight major ways of providing housing finance.  Though MBS are the 
major focus of this paper, the other seven are worth considering briefly, so as to highlight the 
special features of MBS. 
 (1) Owner self-finance.  The buyer-owner provides the finance, through prior personal 
saving; the other elements are irrelevant. 
 (2) Seller finance.  The seller provides the finance.  In essence, the seller accepts payment 
for the sale of the house in a stretched-out schedule, thereby extending an implicit loan to the buyer. 
 The seller originates the loan, funds it, and services it.  The residential unit that is being financed 
will almost always serve as the collateral for the loan, which in this form would be described as a 
mortgage. 
 (3) Third-party finance: family or friend.  A family member or friend extends the loan 
(mortgage) to the owner and thus originates, funds, and services it. 
 (4) Third-party finance: a bank or other depository.  A bank extends the loan (mortgage) to 
the owner and thus originates, funds, and services it.10  In turn, the bank receives most of its 
                                                           
    10 The bank could (in principle) buy the loan from a specialist originator and contract out the servicing to a non-bank 
specialist -- perhaps, the originator.  But, at least through the 1970s banks and other depositories in the U.S. (especially 
savings institutions, such as savings and loan institutions) that did engage in mortgage lending tended to be vertically 
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financing from depositors; but the depositors' claims for repayment of their funds are directly on the 
bank, not on the borrowers to whom the bank has extended mortgages. 
 (5) Third-party finance: an insurance company.11  Most insurance companies that hold 
mortgages do not originate them.  Accordingly, origination would be by a mortgage bank (an 
origination specialist), which would sell the mortgage to the insurance company.  The latter funds 
and services it.12  The insurance company, in turn obtains its funding from the premiums paid by its 
insureds and from any additional borrowing that it may undertake. 
 (6) Third-party finance: a finance company.  If a finance company holds mortgages, it is 
unlikely to originate them; again, origination would be by a mortgage banker, who would sell it to 
the finance company that funds and services it.  The finance company's funding, in turn, comes 
from its borrowings in capital markets. 
 (7) Third-party finance: government.  In principle, government could provide the mortgage 
(with either direct origination, or origination by a mortgage bank), with funding ultimately by 
taxpayers or by government borrowing.13 
 (8) Third-party finance: MBS.  The originator either "packages" the mortgage (with other 
mortgages) into a security, or sells the mortgage to another entity that does the packaging.  The 
"pass-through" security (so-named because the borrower's interest and principal payments14 are 
passed through to the buyer) is then sold to a party that wishes to hold the security and receive the 
interest and repaid principal and is thus the funder.  That party may be a private investor, a mutual 
                                                                                                                                                             
integrated and thus to undertake all three functions. 
    11 A similar pattern would apply to a pension fund that chose to hold mortgages. 
    12 Again, the insurance company may contract out the servicing, perhaps to the originator. 
    13 In the U.S., the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was, until 1968, an entity within the U.S. 
Government that bought mortgages that were originated by mortgage banks. 
 
    14 Minus any servicing fees and other transactions fees related to the securitization process. 
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fund, a pension fund, a bank, an insurance company, or any other entity that is attracted to the MBS 
as an investment.  The servicing may be done by the originator, or the servicing may be sold to a 
specialist servicer.  Since the MBS are securities, they may be readily sold to other investors in a 
"secondary market". 
 We now turn to further discussion of the MBS process. 
 
 
 IV. Mortgage-Backed Securities for Housing Finance 
 Because, even in the U.S., the MBS process that was described at the end of the previous 
section is still relatively new and less familiar -- especially as compared with the "traditional" form 
of housing finance, which involves a bank or other depository as the originator, funder, and servicer 
-- some additional discussion of the special features and concerns of the MBS process is surely 
warranted. 
 
A. Lender concern about timely repayment (credit risk). 
 Recall that a central focus of all of finance is the lender's concern about repayment by the 
borrower.  This concern is paramount in the case of MBS, where the borrowers are households that 
are unknown to the investors who purchase the MBS.15  Consequently, the MBS process in the U.S. 
involves a number of steps that offer assurance to investors that they will receive timely payment of 
interest and principal -- and that thus widen the potential market for this category of securities. 
 First, the nature of the loan itself -- a mortgage, with the housing unit itself providing the 
collateral that offers some reassurance of repayment -- provides a major form of assurance (as 
                                                           
    15 This contrasts with the bank-focused method of housing finance, where the bank as originator, servicer, and funder 
of the mortgage loan acquires extensive knowledge about the borrower; and the depositors (the ultimate funders) rely on 
the solvency of the bank, its reputation, and safety-and-soundness governmental regulation for the safety of their deposit 
“investment”. 
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compared with, say, personal loans that have no specific collateral).16 
 Second, the mortgages are bundled into pools of hundreds (or sometimes thousands) of 
mortgages each, so that there is greater safety in large numbers and diversification. 
 Third, underwriting standards for mortgage lending usually require loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratios (percentages) that are significantly below 100%, so as to allow for some loss in value in the 
collateral that would still permit the loan to be repaid in full, or the standards insist on third party 
mortgage insurance to cover potential losses.  In the U.S., a maximum LTV ratio of 80% is the 
norm, with any higher LTV (up to 95%) requiring mortgage insurance.17 
 Fourth, the packager of the mortgages (who is the issuer of the MBS) may place the 
mortgages in a "special purpose entity" -- usually a trust -- that is wholly owned by the issuer but 
that is legally separate ("bankruptcy remote") from the issuer.  This separation allows the mortgages 
(which are, of course, the underlying assets that support the issued MBS) to be unaffected by any 
adverse financial events that might affect the issuer.  Again, this provides additional assurance for 
investors.18 
 Fifth, the packager/issuer will seek assurances (including a recourse option to return 
unsatisfactory mortgages) from the originator that high standards of origination have been 
maintained, so that the packager/issuer can offer these assurances to investors. 
                                                           
    16 Implicit, but very important for any kind of mortgage finance, is the clear establishment of property rights and title 
in residential housing and a clear process of foreclosure in the event of borrower default.  Also important is the 
availability of market information about housing buy/sell transactions, supplemented by appraisals, so that lenders can 
be comfortable that the value of the collateral exceeds the mortgage.  Finally, the fact that residential housing in most 
areas in the U.S. has been rising in value since the 1930s (albeit with some local dips at some specific times) has 
provided further assurance to lenders that the collateral is likely to continue to exceed the value of the loan during the 
life of the loan. 
    17 The average LTV ratio for newly issued mortgages in the U.S. for the years 1994-2003 was 77.8%; for 2001-2003 
the average was 74.9%. 
    18 In the U.S., the quasi-governmental nature of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Credit Corporation (Freddie Mac) has allowed these two MBS issuers to avoid the 
necessity of using trusts for their MBS. 
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 Sixth, despite the protections just described, investors are still likely to be concerned about 
the certainty and timeliness of repayment.  This demand for certainty has been addressed in two 
ways.  First, the overwhelming majority -- over 80% -- of MBS in the U.S. has been issued with 
guarantees by governmental or quasi-governmental entities.  In the direct governmental category are 
the MBS of the Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), which is a part of the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  In the quasi-governmental category 
are the MBS of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), which are special corporations19 that have been 
chartered by the Congress.  Though Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are publicly traded corporations, 
their special national charter and special privileges20 have convinced the financial markets that the 
U.S. Government would be unlikely to allow the two companies to default on their obligations in 
the event of financial difficulties.21 
 A second method of assurance to investors, offered by non-governmental ("private label") 
issuers of MBS, is for the issuer to provide some form of credit enhancement for the securities.  The 
credit enhancement can be "external", such as third-party guarantees or insurance; or they can be 
internal to the pool of mortgages itself: a structuring of the pool of securities into "senior" and 
"subordinated" components, with the senior securities being the MBS that are sold to investors and 
                                                           
    19 A common phrase that is used in connection with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and a few other similar entities) is 
"government sponsored enterprise" (GSE).  Their debt and MBS are usually described in the credit markets as "agency" 
issues. 
    20 Those privileges include the authorization of the U.S. Treasury to lend each up to $2.25 billion; exemptions from 
state and local income taxes; exemptions from the Securities and Exchange Commission's registration requirements and 
fees; the ability to use the Federal Reserve as their fiscal agent; the eligibility of their debt for use as collateral for public 
deposits, for purchase by the Federal Reserve in open-market operations, and for unlimited investment by banks and 
other depositories; the designation of their securities as government securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934; the exemption of their securities from many state investor protection laws; and lower regulatory (safety-and-
soundness) capital requirements for holding mortgages than apply to banks and other depositories. 
    21 Further discussion of the special nature of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be found in USCBO (2001a), 
White (2003), and Frame and White (forthcoming). 
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the subordinated component held by the issuer (or sold to someone who is prepared to absorb the 
risks, which may be considerable, of non-payment).22  The subordinated component absorbs the 
first default losses, up to some percentage (which can range between 4% and 20%), which provides 
greater assurance to the holders of the senior MBS.23 Almost always, bond rating firms (Moody's, 
Standard & Poor's, and/or Fitch) are asked to provide a rating that provides a judgment as to the 
safety of the senior MBS; the issuer's desire to obtain a high rating (so as to appeal to investors that 
seek safety), in turn, is usually the determinative factor of the extent of the default losses that the 
subordinated component is required to absorb. 
 
B. Lender concern about early repayment (interest-rate risk). 
 A mortgage is a long-lived debt instrument.  The usual term of a mortgage in the U.S. is 30 
years, and few mortgages are issued with terms of less than 15 years.24  They are level-payment 
(i.e., constant monthly payments) and self-amortizing, so that principal is being repaid throughout 
the term of the mortgage (small amounts at first, and gradually increasing amounts over time).  
They generally can be repaid, partially or fully, without any penalty for "prepayment".25  Finally, 
most of the mortgages issued in the U.S. carry fixed interest rates (rather than rates that adjust with 
                                                           
    22 In the 1980s, the external forms of enhancement were the dominant means of enhancement.  But mortgages are 
long-lived and the financial health of the guarantor could (and did) change.  Consequently, these methods became less 
popular in the 1990s.  As of the late 1990s, well over 70% of the credit enhancements came through the senior-
subordinated structure described in the text, and in 1999-2001 well over 90% of enhancements were structured this way. 
 The rising financial sophistication of MBS investors and the increased financial engineering prowess of the securities 
industry surely contributed to this trend. 
    23 The subordinated component itself may be divided into separate tranches that represent earlier or later absorption of 
the risks of default losses. 
    24 The average maturity of newly issued mortgages in the U.S. for the years 1994-2003 was 27.5 years; for 2001-
2003, the average maturity was 27.2 years. 
    25 In essence, the borrower has an embedded "call" option that allows the borrower to "call" (repay) the mortgage at 
any time. 
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some index of market interest rates),26 and an even higher fraction of the MBS issued has fixed-rate 
mortgages underlying them.27 
 The fixed-rate characteristic of the mortgages, combined with the absence of prepayment 
penalties, imply that the holders of such mortgages, or the MBS based on such mortgages, are 
exposed to substantial risks of "premature" repayment.  Some early repayment would be expected 
for any kind of mortgage, since a fraction of households per time period would be expected to move 
to other locations, as a consequence of employment changes or other family demands, thereby 
selling their houses and repaying their mortgages.  But the fixed-rate element provides an incentive 
for borrowers to refinance their mortgages when interest rates decrease below their original 
contractual rate by a sufficient amount so as to cover the transactions costs of the refinancing. 
 Such "prepayments" are an inconvenience in any event for investors, since the prepayments 
mean that the investors must incur the transactions costs of reinvestments.  More important, for 
fixed-rate MBS, since refinancing-motivated prepayments are likely to swell when interest rates 
decline, such prepayments will mean that the investor will be forced "prematurely" to reinvest at a 
lower interest rate than was embodied in the MBS that is being prepaid.28  Conversely, prepayments 
are likely to decrease when market interest rates rise above the original contract rate of the 
mortgage, at just the time when the investor wishes that the borrower would prepay, so that the 
investor could reinvest at the higher market rates. 
 Accordingly, investors would be expected to be concerned about and interested in 
                                                           
    26 For the years 1994-2003, 78% of newly issued mortgages carried fixed rates of interest; for 2001-2003, 84% 
carried fixed rates of interest. 
    27 Because banks and other depositories have become generally reluctant to bear significant amounts of interest-rate 
risk on their balance sheets, they are likely to sell most of the fixed-rate mortgages that they originate into the secondary 
market, whereas they are more likely to hold in their portfolios all or most of the adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) that 
they originate. 
    28 The repayment (call) option that is embedded in a residential mortgage thus adds considerably to the interest-rate 
risk that normally accompanies any fixed-rate long-term debt instrument. 
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understanding the prepayment characteristics of MBS in general and of specific kinds of MBS, so 
as to be able to place accurate values on MBS.  Specific factors that would be likely to affect the 
prepayment proclivity of an outstanding mortgage (and thus of the MBS derived from it) would 
include: 
 - Whether the mortgage is fixed-rate or adjustable, and its specific terms; 
 - The difference between the mortgage's interest rate and current market rates; 
 - The LTV ratio of the mortgage; 
 - The time since its origination (its "seasoning"); and 
 - Specific demographic factors of the borrowers. 
 Not surprisingly, the considerable talents of the U.S. securities industry have been 
marshaled in two ways to address these concerns.  First, a substantial amount of analytical effort 
has been devoted to measuring and modeling the prepayment experiences of mortgages, so as to 
provide predictions of the prepayment proclivities of specific MBS pools.29  Second, and at least as 
important, since the early 1980s many MBS have been structured as “collateralized mortgage 
obligations” (CMOs).30  These are multi-tranche securities, where (for example) one class receives 
all of the principal repayments from the mortgages in the pool, including prepayments, until that 
class is paid off, then a second class receives its principal repayments until it is paid off, etc.  
Investors can thereby choose whether they want a shorter-term or a longer-term security and have 
greater assurance and buffering from the vagaries of prepayments. 
 
                                                           
    29 A substantial fraction of the discussion in the general "handbooks" and other treatises on MBS -- such as Fabozzi et 
al. (1997, 2000), Fabozzi and Dunleavy (1997), Hu (1997), Fabozzi (2001), and Hayre (2001b) -- is devoted to analysis 
of the prepayment characteristics of MBS. 
    30 Prior to 1986, some CMOs faced tax complications.  Legislation passed in that year eliminated those complications 
for multi-tranche securities that were labeled "real estate mortgage investment conduits" (REMICs).  Since then, these 
multi-tranche securities have been interchangeably described as CMOs or REMICs. 
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C. The advantages of the MBS channel. 
 The advantages of the MBS process can now be seen.  By converting the hitherto 
(generally) nontraded and nontradable mortgage into a liquid security,31 the MBS process widens 
the potential market for funding mortgages beyond just the depositor-driven funding that underlies 
a bank-oriented mortgage system.  It thereby increases the supply of finance for housing:  The 
ultimate providers of funds have the choice of investing directly in housing finance through the 
purchase of MBS (or through the purchase of shares in intermediaries that invest in MBS, such as 
mutual funds) or investing indirectly in housing finance through deposits in banks.  In turn, the 
increase in supply of funds should lower interest rates.  Further, the added depth of the securities 
markets should make that supply generally more elastic, which should allow the overall mortgage 
finance system to be more flexible, more accommodating of fluctuations in the demand for finance, 
and less prone to supply-driven liquidity "crunches".32 
 There are, however, tradeoffs with respect to widening the supply of housing finance 
beyond a bank-focused system.  On the one hand, when only banks -- or perhaps even a more 
narrowly focused depository institution, such as savings and loan (S&L) institutions in the U.S. or 
building societies in the U.K. – are the suppliers of housing finance, they are expected to "be there, 
through good times and not-so-good times".  But this means that their supply of finance is relatively 
inelastic and will be inflexible in dealing with the waxing and waning of the demand for housing 
finance.  Further, the narrow focus for the institution may be dangerous for its long-run health, as 
was the case for the S&Ls in the U.S.33  And the improved technologies of finance may weaken 
                                                           
    31 Technically, the MBS is not the mortgage itself but a claim on the "pass through" of the cash flows of the mortgage, 
less any fees charged by servicers, packagers, etc. 
    32 Whether an MBS system is inherently more efficient than a depository-oriented system, absent the special 
governmental and regulatory advantages that attach to Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, remains an open 
question.  For competing views on this topic, see Van Order (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2001) and White (2003). 
    33 See White (1991). 
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their specialness in any event.  A widening of the supply of finance to encompass MBS reduces 
these problems.  On the other hand, the introduction of the MBS system will mean that interest 
rates in the housing finance sector are now linked to the wider securities markets, and any 
fluctuations that affect those markets, rather than being determined solely by the specialized 
lenders. 
 Equally important, the creation of securities based on the mortgage cash flows permits a 
"slicing and dicing" of those flows into more finely structured securities that can appeal more 
closely to the preferences and tolerances of investors with respect to credit risk, maturity, and 
prepayment risk.  Two methods of slicing and dicing have already been mentioned:  the 
senior/subordinated structure to deal with credit risk, and the CMO multi-tranche structure to deal 
with prepayment risk.  Another straightforward way of dividing the cash flows is to separate them 
simply into principal repayments (principal only, or PO) and interest payments (interest only, or 
IO), and to sell the PO and IO securities separately.  Other variations are limited only by the 
imaginations of securities financial "engineers" and the preferences of investors. 
 By more closely aligning the properties of specific securities with the preferences of 
investors, the MBS process again broadens the investor base for housing finance, with the 
consequent beneficial effects mentioned above. 
 
D. The disadvantages of MBS. 
 There are three potential disadvantages to a system that uses MBS for residential housing 
finance.  First, as compared with a bank-based system, the vertical disintegration of the finance 
process that accompanies the MBS approach has the potential for creating additional problems of 
asymmetric information.  In the MBS system, the securities packager must rely on the originator to 
deliver good mortgages, and the securities buyer must rely on the packager to deliver good 
securities and also on the servicer to forward cash flows honestly and to pursue delinquent 
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borrowers conscientiously.  If incentive mechanisms for good performance, the reputations of the 
parties involved, and/or penalties for non-performance are inadequate, the MBS system may 
disintegrate, with losses for "burned" investors and social adjustment costs for replacing the MBS 
system with something else. 
 Second, the U.S. MBS system has relied heavily on governmental and quasi-governmental 
entities for MBS issuance.  It is no accident that the governmental and quasi-governmental entities 
have been important in the MBS process.  As was noted above, MBS involve securities that are 
backed by mortgages issued to homeowners that the securities holders do not know.  A concern 
about the credit risk underlying such securities is understandable.  The credible guarantees of 
governmental and quasi-governmental issuers provide an instant solution to that problem.  
However, such guarantees do not come free.  Though the Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie 
Mac MBS programs have thus far not required taxpayer funds, they nevertheless continue to 
represent a contingent liability of the U.S. Government.  The implicit cost of the government's 
likely backing of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as of 2003, was around $13 billion per year.34 
 Third, the introduction of an MBS system into a housing finance system that is already 
bank-oriented will inevitably produce some political economy frictions with the incumbent finance 
providers.  Though this type of friction is inevitable whenever any new technology brings new 
entrants into an industry, the banking sector is especially prone to frictions because of its high 
degree of leverage, its extensive regulation, and the special nature of banks' balance sheets, with 
deposits as the core liabilities that are likely to have an explicit or implicit government guarantee in 
                                                           
    34 See Frame and White (forthcoming).  As White (2003) and Frame and White (forthcoming) point out, in the U.S. 
context, where other governmental actions already heavily subsidize residential housing, the implicit government 
backing for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is simply providing additional support for housing finance that tends to 
encourage the purchase of additional amounts of housing by purchasers who would likely become owners anyway, while 
having only modest effects on expanding home ownership by the segment of the population (lower and moderate income 
households that are first-time buyers) where the social value of encouraging ownership would be the greatest. 
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the event of a bank's insolvency.35  Such potential frictions are not an argument against the 
introduction of an MBS system that would be otherwise sensible, but they do argue for extra 
regulatory care with respect to the safety-and-soundness of the banks during any transition phase.36 
 
E. The pre-requisites for a well-functioning MBS system. 
 A well-functioning MBS system first needs the pre-requisites that are essential for any well-
functioning housing finance system: 
 - A legal system of clear property rights in housing and clear reporting of title and of liens 
against the title; 
 - A legal system that permits relatively rapid foreclosure by the lender in the event of 
borrower default, with well understood rights and procedures for all parties; 
 - A tax system that does not unduly tax the transactional steps that are necessary for the 
provision of finance; 
 - An institutional and legal framework that does not hinder the development of institutions 
and support personnel for efficient housing finance (e.g., brokers to help bring borrowers and 
lenders together; mortgage insurers; credit bureaus; appraisers; etc.) 
 - An institutional and legal framework that does not hinder the gathering of information 
about borrowers by lenders; and 
 - A functioning market in house sales that provides comparison-based housing value data 
that, supported by appraisals, provides the basis for lenders' valuations of the housing collateral that 
supports mortgage loans. 
                                                           
    35 See, for example, White (1991, 2002). 
    36 In the U.S., the expansion of the MBS channel of residential housing finance was partly a response to the rigidities 
in the 1970s and early 1980s that had developed in the traditional S&L-focused channel, then partly an additional source 
of competition to and exacerbation of the problems of the S&Ls in the mid and late 1980s, and then finally a response to 
the relative decline of the S&Ls as a source of housing finance in the 1990s.  See White (1991) and Van Order (2001). 
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 In addition to these elements, an MBS system requires: 
 - The institutional development of a set of specialized originators, servicers, and securities 
packagers; 
 - A legal and institutional framework that provides incentives and penalties to motivate 
these parties to perform their roles honestly and efficiently; 
 - A legal and tax framework that does not hinder the specific steps that are necessary to 
create securities and to structure securities so as to deal with credit risk and prepayment risk; 
 - A legal and institutional framework that does not hinder the standardization of mortgage 
arrangements, including terms and documentation; 
 - A legal and tax framework that does not discourage investors of all kinds -- individuals, 
banks and other depositories, insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, finance 
companies, overseas investors, etc. -- from buying and holding MBS; and 
 - A securities markets institutional framework (brokers, dealers, market makers, analysts, 
etc.) that facilitates the buying and selling of securities. 
 
 
 V. The Historical and Recent Experience in the U.S. 
A. The issuance of MBS. 
 From its beginning, the issuance of MBS in the U.S. has been dominated by governmental 
and quasi-governmental entities, although "private label" MBS have been growing in relative 
importance after a late and slow start.  The experience of MBS in the U.S. began in 1970, with 
MBS issued by Ginnie Mae.37  Freddie Mac, newly created in 1970, issued its first MBS in 1971.  
                                                           
    37 The collateral for the Ginnie Mae MBS was and continues to be mortgages that are insured by two other 
government organizations, the Federal Housing Authority (a part of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development) and the Veterans Administration.  Ginnie Mae adds its guarantee of timely payment of principal and 
interest on top of the insurance provided by the other two government entities. 
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Fannie Mae, though in existence since 1938, issued its first MBS in 1981.  Finally, the first "private 
label" MBS was issued in 1977, by Bank of America. 
 Table 1 provides time series data on the overall size of the residential mortgage market, as 
measured by the stock of mortgages outstanding, and the fraction of mortgages accounted for by 
holders of various kinds, including mortgages that are converted into MBS.  As can be seen, the 
fraction of mortgages that have been converted into MBS have continued to rise; as of 2003, MBS 
of all kinds accounted for over half of single-family residential mortgages and a third of multi-
family residential mortgages.38  Further, the data indicate that nongovernment (i.e., privately issued) 
MBS, after starting later than government MBS, has been growing more rapidly, especially in the 
multi-family area.39  Nevertheless, the data clearly indicate that the overall government presence in 
mortgages -- government MBS plus "federal and related agencies" -- is substantial: over 50% for 
single-family mortgages, and just under a third for multi-family mortgages. 
 
B. Holding MBS. 
 Table 2 shows the recent distribution of the holdings of "agency" securities, which includes 
the MBS of Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac but also the straight debt issues of Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank system.  Though these data go beyond just the 
agencies' MBS (and exclude the holdings of non-agency MBS), the agencies' MBS are the majority 
asset in the mix, and thus the data give an approximate picture of investor interest in MBS.  As can 
be seen, banks are the leading holder of these securities, followed by non-U.S. investors.  
                                                           
    38 These fractions overstate somewhat the MBS presence in the market, since they include MBS that are held by 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in their portfolios.  But the trends are quite clear. 
    39 That there would be faster growth by non-governmental MBS in the multi-family area is understandable.  This is an 
area with greater heterogeneity, and it is less susceptible to the "cookie cutter" approach of much of the single-family 
"conforming loan" market that is the staple of the MBS of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which should give other MBS 
issuers a greater relative advantage. 
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Households and mutual funds are the next two largest holders, and these leading four groups 
together account for over 50% of the holdings of these securities.  A big change from fifteen years 
earlier has been the increase in holdings by non-U.S. investors.  In 1988, this group held only 3.0% 
of the total, as compared with the 13.5% that they held in 2003. 
 
C. The effects on housing finance. 
 As was discussed above, the addition of an MBS channel to an already established 
depository-oriented channel, as happened in the U.S., would be expected to expand supply and 
reduce interest rates, as compared with what otherwise would have occurred in the absence of that 
addition.  There have been a number of efforts to analyze the consequences of the introduction and 
expansion of the MBS channel in the U.S.40  Almost all of the quantitative efforts do show the 
expected result: that more securitization results in lower mortgage rates.  However, much of this 
research has involved the MBS issued by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac, without an 
effort to disentangle the effects of the explicit or implicit government support for the MBS from the 
pure effect of the addition of MBS (even if nongovernmental) on mortgage rates.41  Further, many 
of the studies focus on the marginal effects of MBS issuance,42 and there have been no explicit 
efforts to quantify the overall effects of MBS (with and without governmental support) on the 
residential mortgage market. 
                                                           
    40 Summaries are provided in Kolari et al. (1998) and USCBO (2001b). 
    41 There have been efforts to identify the specific effects that the presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have on 
the interest rates of the residential mortgages that conform to their underwriting standards and to the mortgage amount 
ceiling ($333,700, as of 2004) to which they must adhere.  Recent estimates (USCBO 2001a, 2001b) estimate the 
reduction at about 25 basis points.  The differential tends to vary over time as conditions in the credit markets have 
varied.  Estimates in the mid 1990s placed the differential in the range of 25-35 basis points.  See Hendershott and 
Shilling (1989) and Cotterman and Pearce (1996).  But, again, these studies do not isolate the pure effects of MBS on 
mortgage rates and do not provide an overall quantitative assessment. 
    42 For example, Kolari et al. (1998) find that an increase of MBS issuance by 10% (e.g., an expansion of the MBS 
share of the residential mortgage market from 50% to 55%) has the effect of lowering mortgage yield spreads (against 
comparable Treasury yields) of 20 basis points. 
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 Consequently, one can only offer the conclusion that the effects of the introduction of MBS 
into the U.S. residential housing finance system have surely been substantial, especially when one 
includes the elements of governmental support, but an exact quantification of those effects still 
remains to be done. 
 
 VI. Conclusion 
  An MBS system can be a valuable part of a country's residential housing finance 
arrangements.  For someone who is steeped in a traditional bank-oriented method finance, the MBS 
approach will surely seem strange and unfamiliar.  Keeping track of the vertically disintegrated 
functions -- which parties perform which functions and have which responsibilities and bear which 
risks -- is certainly more complicated than in a vertically integrated bank-focused system.  The 
MBS system needs much of the same legal and institutional infrastructure that a bank-oriented 
system needs; but the MBS system also needs additional legal and institutional arrangements and 
support, with the dangers that breakdowns of that support can unravel an MBS system.  And the 
MBS system in the U.S. has been heavily dependent on government and quasi-government entities, 
with the continuing risk of potential claims on taxpayers in the event of losses. 
 However, the advantages of an MBS system -- that it can supplement a bank-oriented 
finance system and allow the housing finance system to access the capital markets directly and thus 
expand the supply of finance for housing -- are substantial and make an MBS system worthy of 
serious consideration for any country. 
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Figure 1: The Spectrum of Informational Opaqueness/Transparency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Borrower:  Opaque       Transparent 
 
Source of finance: Personal finance,     Banks and other    Securities markets 
    friends, family financial intermediaries, 
    (credit cards)        trade credit 
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Table 1: The Percentage Distribution of Residential Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1970-2003 
 
         1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003
Single-family residential mortgages (total amount, $B)a $294 $491 $987 $1,524 $2,619 $3,469 $5,142 $7,171
     Commercial banks 14.4% 16.1% 16.5% 13.9% 16.4% 19.6% 18.8% 18.8%
     Savings institutions 55.7% 56.4% 49.7% 36.9% 22.9% 13.9% 11.6% 9.8%
     Life insurance companies 9.1% 3.7% 1.9% 0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%
     Federal and related agenciesb 7.4% 8.5% 7.9% 8.6% 5.8% 6.6% 4.3% 5.4%
     Individuals and othersc 12.6% 10.0% 12.9% 14.5% 14.5% 9.1% 9.6% 9.8%
     MBS, governmentd 0.8% 5.3% 11.1% 23.7% 37.8% 44.5% 47.2% 47.0%
     MBS, non-government 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 2.1% 6.0% 8.4% 9.7%
         
Multi-family residential mortgages (total amount, $B) $60 $101 $142 $206 $288 $276 $401 $544
     Commercial banks 5.4% 5.9% 9.0% 11.3% 12.3% 15.4% 19.4% 19.3%
     Savings institutions 35.9% 39.0% 38.0% 43.3% 31.8% 22.5% 15.3% 14.3%
     Life insurance companies 26.6% 19.5% 13.7% 9.7% 10.1% 10.4% 8.4% 7.0%
     Federal and related agenciesb  5.7% 12.3% 12.0% 9.1% 12.5% 13.1% 9.7% 11.1%
     Individuals and othersc 26.4% 22.1% 23.1% 23.2% 33.0% 24.4% 18.8% 14.9%
     MBS, governmentd 0.0% 1.2% 4.2% 3.4% 10.0% 9.8% 16.5% 21.1%
     MBS, non-government   0.0%   0.0%   0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 4.4% 11.9% 12.3%
 
Note: The percentages for each category, such as commercial banks, represent the “whole loans” that are held and that have not been 
securitized. 
a  Includes 1-4 residential units. 
b  Includes the portfolio holdings of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, FHA, VA, the Farmers Home Administration, the Federal 
Land Banks, and other federal agencies. 
c  Other holders include mortgage companies, real estate investment trusts, state and local credit agencies, state and local retirement    
funds, credit unions, and finance companies. 
d  Includes MBS that is held in portfolio by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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Table 2: The Percentage Distribution of Ownership of Agency MBS and Other Agency Debt 
Securities, 2003a 
 
Banks 20.9%
Rest of the world 13.5%
Households 10.0%
Mutual funds 9.4%
Money market mutual funds 6.8%
Life insurance companies 7.6%
Asset-backed securities issuers 6.5%
Private pension plans 5.2%
State and local governments 4.2%
Savings institutions 4.2%
State and local government retirement funds 3.3%
Other insurance companies 2.6%
Credit unions 2.4%
Brokers and dealers 1.8%
Bank personal trusts and estates 0.7%
Real estate investment trusts 0.5%
Nonfinancial corporations 0.3%
Federal government retirement funds 0.1%
 
a At year end; includes the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system, Farmer’s Home 
Administration, and Tennessee Valley Authority; excludes Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
holdings of their own MBS and the FHLBs’ holdings of MBS. 
 
Source: Federal Reserve 
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